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Twenty-five years ago, Florida excluded expert witness testi-
mony on the factors contributing to unreliable identifications because
the testimony was not beyond the commonsense of jurors.1 That deci-
sion was wrong. Thirty years of study show eyewitness identifications
are fallible, factors contributing to unreliability are not matters of com-
monsense, and cross-examination along with jury instructions
inadequately improve jurors' assessments of eyewitness accuracy.
Admissibility of expert testimony is a matter of constitutional
importance. Accused individuals have the right to present witnesses in
their defense. Disallowing the presentation of expert testimony about
the factors affecting reliability of eyewitness identifications impedes
defendants' rights to due process of law under the Florida and United
States Constitutions. Expert testimony is essential to the defense the-
ory of mistaken identification and ascertaining guilt or innocence.
Recent research has shown that mistaken identification is the
leading cause of wrongful convictions. As of this writing, there have
been 235 DNA-exonerations. 2 The Innocence Project has identified
eyewitness misidentification as the "single greatest cause of wrongful
convictions nationwide, playing a role in more than 75 percent of con-
victions overturned through DNA testing.
'3
* Alisa M. Smith, Assistant Professor, Criminology Department, University of
Tampa; J.D., Florida State University; Ph.D. Criminology, Florida State University; M.S.,
Florida State University; B.A. Florida Atlantic University.
1. Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983) Johnson alleged police lineup was
unnecessarily suggestive because he was the only one with a suntan, blond hair, and a
lighter blue inmate uniform. Johnson's expert witness would have explained both common
problems in lineup identifications and general factors affecting witness accuracy as well as
the suggestive nature of the lineup. Id. at 777.
2. The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
3. The Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (Exonerations
have been won in 33 states; 17 of 235 people have served time on death row; average time
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Continuing to exclude expert testimony in Florida is improper
for three reasons. First, it violates defendants' constitutional right to
due process and the presentation of their defense. Second, it is incon-
sistent with scientific principles and statutory law on admissibility of
expert testimony. Third, it is an abuse of discretion to exclude rele-
vant, critical, and reliable evidence that supports theories of defense.
Florida law on the admissibility of eyewitness-identification tes-
timony conflicts with constitutional principles, science, statutory
interpretation, and applied standards of appellate review. Florida law
remains unsettled with precedent and empirical evidence portending
its admissibility. The following article reviews the conflicts that
plague Florida law stating the, case for admitting expert testimony
when it supports the defense theory of mistaken identification.
II. FLORIDA LAW: THE CONFLICTS
First, Florida law conflicts with the 1973 decision by the Su-
preme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi,4 which held that criminal
defendants have the constitutional right to present their defense.
5
Barring expert testimony on mistaken identifications violates the prin-
ciples of Chambers. Second, Florida decisions about eyewitness-expert
testimony conflict with one another and well-settled scientific princi-
ples.6 Third, Florida decisions have essentially conveyed unbridled
discretion to trial judges to exclude eyewitness-identification testi-
mony, as compared with the limited discretion for excluding evidence
that even indirectly raises reasonable doubt.
served by exonerees is 12 years; and the average age of exonerees at the time of their
wrongful conviction was 26).
4. 410 U.S. 284, 302, (1973).
5. Compare Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (exclusion of critical testimonial evidence
and refusal by the State to allow Chambers to cross-examine the witness denied him a fair
trial and due process) and Johnson, supra note 1.
6. Compare Johnson, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983) (excluding expert testimony on
common problems of lineup identification and general factors affecting witness), and
McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1998) (holding that admissibility of expert
testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony is to be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge), and Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1120 (Fla. 2006)
(holding that showing only one photo and one vehicle to witness was unduly suggestive
identification method; witness's independent recollection of victim and defendant vehicle at
time of crime provided basis for her identification uninfluenced by suggestive procedure was
not per se inadmissible).
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A. Conflict I: Constitutional Principles
1. Early history of excluding witnesses
In United States v. Reid,7 a Virginia law that barred an un-ac-
quitted co-defendant from testifying for the defense was narrowed by
Logan v. United States8 and Benson v. United States,9 and reversed by
Rosen v. United States.10 In Reid, the Court relied on the rules of evi-
dence and the common law to exclude witnesses because the Judiciary
Act of 1789 adopted state laws disqualifying witnesses.'1 In Logan, the
Court reversed the exclusion of a defense witness because the Gover-
nor pardoned the witness. 12 The Court reasoned the witness was no
longer subject to disqualification under common law, and therefore,
competent to testify.' 3 Between the Reid, Logan, and Benson deci-
sions, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
was ratified to protect individuals from being deprived of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law. Congress also passed a num-
ber of statutes enforcing due process.' 4 Two of those statutes relied on
by the Court in Benson, prohibited excluding witnesses at trial based
on race,' 5 and permitting criminal defendants to testify at their own
request. In Benson, the Court confronted whether Benson's wife was
competent to testify against him, not for him. Although the reasons
Benson's wife was excluded were the same as in Reid: (1) that common
law excluded witnesses interested in the proceedings, and (2) the wit-
ness was a party to the record; the Benson Court perfunctorily
dismissed Reid, and revisited the question "in light of general author-
ity and sound reason."16 The Court rejected the former reasons as
irrational and decided Benson's wife was competent to testify against
him. 17 Reid was explicitly overruled in Rosen.'
8
7. 53 U.S. 361 (1851).
8. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
9. 146 U.S. 325 (1892) (defendant's wife testimony was admissible because the
defendant had suggested she need not testify unless she so desired).
10. 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (the competency of the witness should be determined by the
jury).
11. Reid, 53 U.S. 361.
12. Logan, 144 U.S. at 303.
13. Id.
14. Benson, 146 U.S. at 336. ("By Congress, in July, 1864, (Rev. St. § 858) it was
enacted that... no witness shall be excluded in any action on account of color..." an act
permitting the defendant in criminal cases to testify at
15. Benson, 146 U.S. at 336
16. Benson, 146 U.S. at 335.
17. Id. at 327.
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In Rosen, over defense objection, the testimony of Rosen's co-
defendant, Broder, was offered against him. 19 Broder and Rosen both
were charged with conspiring to buy and receive checks and letters sto-
len from the postal service. 20 Broder had entered a guilty plea and
later called as a witness to testify against Rosen. 21 Rosen argued, rely-
ing on Reid, that Broder, a convicted forger, was disqualified from
testifying because the law of New York in 1789 would have excluded
him as incompetent. 22 Relying on trends in courts and legislative bod-
ies that removed constraints on witness competency, the Court
concluded the common law rule no longer applied:
Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight of
judicial authority which have developed in support of this modern
rule, especially as applied to the competency of witnesses convicted
of crime, proceed upon sound principle, we conclude that the dead
hand of the common-law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to
such cases as we have here, and that the ruling of the lower courts
on this first claim of error should be approved.
23
2. The Sixth Amendment and confronting witnesses
The Sixth Amendment was not at issue in Rosen.24 Rosen was
trying to exclude his co-defendant from testifying against him. The
first time the Supreme Court addressed whether the right of defend-
ants under the Sixth Amendment to have a compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in their favor was fundamental to a fair trial was
in Washington v. Texas.25 In Washington, the Supreme Court held
Washington's right to present witnesses was violated when the trial
court excluded Fuller, a co-defendant, and the person who shot and
killed the victim from testifying.26 Fuller would have testified that he
took the gun from Washington, Washington tried to convince him not
to shoot anyone, and Washington ran away before the shooting. 27 The
trial judge excluded this plainly relevant and material testimony be-
cause Texas law prohibited charged or convicted co-defendants from
18. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
19. Rosen, 245 U.S. at 468
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Rosen, 245 U.S. at 468.
23. Rosen, 245 U.S. at 471.
24. Id. at 471.
25. 388 U.S. 14, 17 (1967).
26. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
27. Id. at 16.
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testifying for one another.28 The Court struck the law because it con-
flicted with the Sixth Amendment and the most basic ingredients of
due process:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecu-
tion's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.
This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
29
In Chambers, it wasn't a co-defendant that was excluded from trial but
several witnesses willing to testify that someone, other than the defen-
dant, confessed to his crimes.30 Their testimony was excluded on the
grounds of hearsay.31 The Court interpreted the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments,32 holding that the minimum standard of due process re-
quired for all criminal defendants is to have the opportunity to present
their defense with fair and reliable evidence, submitted in compliance
with the rules of procedure and evidence. 33 Although the testimony
was hearsay, it was the number of witnesses along with corroborating
evidence that demonstrated the reliability of the hearsay confessions.
Minimal due process includes the right to call witnesses:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in es-
sence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations. The rights to confront and cross examination wit-
nesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing
for the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507,
92 L.Ed.2d 682 (1948), identified these rights as among the mini-
mum essentials of a fair trial:
'A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right to his
day in court - are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (Chambers was refused the opportunity to introduce
testimony of three witnesses whom would have testified another person named himself as
the murderer on three separate occasions).
31. Id. at 293.
32. The federal constitution, like Florida's constitution, protects due process: " ... nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. And, the Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the
right to call witnesses: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right. . . to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
2009
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rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. 34
The Chambers court cautioned against the use of procedure to
thwart the admission of evidence. Rules of procedure and evidence
should not be applied "mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."35
Weighty interests of the accused prevail over arbitrary and dispropor-
tionate rules of procedure and evidence. 36 In Green v. Georgia,37 the
Court held that despite its hearsay-nature, relevant, competent evi-
dence that the co-defendant admitted he, not the defendant, had killed
the victim was admissible at sentencing. Due process commanded its
admission. The Court found in Rock v. Arkansas,38 that Arkansas's per
se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony for the purpose of
preventing the defendant from testifying on his own behalf was uncon-
stitutional as a violation of due process and the right to present a
defense. Also, in Crane v. Kentucky, 39 the Court found Crane was de-
nied a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" when
the trial court did not allow testimony about the physical and psycho-
logical circumstances surrounding his confession to the police. The
way the police extracted the confession was relevant to its reliability,
and as the only evidence supporting his conviction; it was essential.
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether excluding any
expert from testifying for criminal defendants violates due process of
law, the right to compulsory process of witnesses and the right to pre-
sent a defense. Precedent, however, suggests that when reliable and
critical to the defense theory of misidentification, experts are essential
to due process and should not be mechanistically excluded. In non-
expert and two expert cases, Florida courts have held, relying on
Chambers,40 that the right to present a defense when that evidence is
critical and relevant to determining guilt and justice overrides Flor-
ida's rules of procedure.
41
34. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294.
35. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
36. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoted in.Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987))
37. 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
38. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
39. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
40. Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
41. Garcia v. State, 816 So. 2d 554, 564-5 (Fla. 2002); Story v. State, 589 So. 2d 939,
943 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); Jenkins
v. State, 872 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
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3. Florida and the right to present a defense
The right to call witnesses and present a defense is fundamen-
tal to Florida law:
Our country is committed to the doctrine that no matter
what the crime one may be charged with he is entitled to a fair and
impartial trial by a jury of his peers. Such a trial contemplates
counsel to look after his defense, compulsory attendance of wit-
nesses, if need be, and a reasonable time in the light of all the
prevailing circumstances to investigate, properly prepare, and pre-
sent his defense. When less than this is given, the spirit and
purpose of the law is defeated.
42
In Garcia43 the excluded testimony of a co-defendant's prior tes-
timony was an unconstitutional application of hearsay that would
"mechanistically . . . defeat the ends of justice."4 4 The First District
Court of Appeal noted that the state's evidence rules must yield, under
some circumstances, to greater constitutional principles. 45 Although
the written confession did not satisfy the formal requirements of ad-
missibility, excluding the third-party confession denied Curtis the
right to a fair trial. 46 In Mateo v. State4 7 excluding audio recordings
that supported Mateo's theory of defense that jail officials lied about
his charges because they were biased against him as wrong. He had
the right to play the recordings to support his theory.
In two cases, the First District Court of Appeal held that exclud-
ing expert witnesses was reversible error. In State v. Clements,'48 it
was error to exclude expert testimony on the effects of alcohol in a driv-
ing under the influence case. The defense was entitled to introduce an
expert who could contradicted the state's argument that drinking four
sixteen-ounce beers, over a four-hour period, impaired the normal fac-
42. FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 9 ensures due process because "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneselfl,]" and
protects criminal defendants right to call witnesses, FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 16(a); See Price v.
State, 295 So. 2d 338, (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
. . . shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at trial
adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both ... 
43. Garcia, 816 So. 2d 554, 564-5 (Fla. 2002).
44. Id. at 565 (the testimony was subjected to cross-examination by the state and
exonerated Garcia).
45. Curtis v. State, 876 So. 2d 13, 19-20 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing a
murder conviction because the trial judge mechanistically applied the rules of evidence to
exclude the written confession of someone other than the defendant).
46. Id. at 23 (declarant was available to testify).
47. 932 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
48. 968 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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ulties of an average social drinker of Clement's weight. 49 The expert
testimony should have been admitted because Clement had a constitu-
tional right to present witnesses in his own defense and the evidence
was relevant and it tended to establish reasonable doubt.
50
Again in Boyer, reversible error was found where expert testi-
mony about factors that contribute to false confessions was excluded.
5 1
The individual was recognized as an expert. He was excluded because
the trial court found his testimony would not assist, but might confuse
the jury:
The court concluded that if Dr. Ofshe testified that false confessions
were obtained when certain tactics or techniques of interrogation
were present, the State, in rebuttal, would introduce expert testi-
mony that true confessions were obtained also when the same
tactics and techniques were present. The court determined such
testimony would lead the jury to speculate to reach a decision it
could have made without such testimony.
52
The Boyer Court found that false-confession testimony should
not be excluded simply because some jurors may have some beliefs
about a subject. 53 The question then becomes whether those beliefs are
correct.54 It is the jury's decision, once educated about the phenome-
non of false confessions, to decide the weight of that testimony.5 5 The
error was not harmless because the expert testimony "went to the
heart" of Boyer's case.
56
Evidence that supports a defense theory or raises reasonable
doubt is typically admitted.57 Expert testimony, when it assists the
jury in understanding a defendant's theory, tends to raise reasonable
doubt. Therefore, scientific evidence on the fallibility of eyewitness
identification that supports the defense theory of mistaken identifica-
tion and raises reasonable doubt should be admitted.
49. Clements, 968 So. 2d 59.
50. Id. at 60.
51. 825 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
52. Id. at 419.
53. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 419, relying United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir.
1996).
54. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 419; United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1345.
55. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 420 (citing United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1344-5).
56. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 420.
57. Clements, 968 So. 2d at 60-1 (quoting Vannier v. State, 714 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)) (citing Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990)).
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B. Conflict II: Eyewitness-identification testimony (1) assists the
jury, and (2) satisfies scientific principles58
Scientific expert testimony must (1) aid the jury and (2) be
based on scientific principles that are sufficiently established and gen-
erally accepted in the particular field that it belongs. 59 Eyewitness
identification satisfies this standard. Yet, Florida decisions continue to
apply the outdated reasoning of Johnson60 that eyewitness-identifica-
tion testimony is not helpful to jurors. The next section provides an
overview of the science of eyewitness identifications and the following
section explores the conflicted application of these scientific principles
by Florida courts.
1. The Science
Mistaken identification occurs because witness and victim
memories are fallible and police strategies exacerbate memory flaws.
Today, expert witnesses, when they are excluded from testifying about
factors that contribute to mistaken identification, are excluded for the
following reasons: (1) Judges think the research findings are not scien-
tifically sound, (2) Judges think the research findings are not beyond
the common knowledge of jurors, and (3) Judges believe traditional
cross-examination and instructions to the jury are sufficient to identify
weaknesses in identification testimony.61 None of these reasons are
valid.
2. 80% of prominent eyewitness identification researchers agree...
In 1989, Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith surveyed sixty-three
prominent eyewitness-identification researchers and found general ac-
ceptance among the scientists of some findings as reliable for
courtroom testimony, including the effect of exposure time, lineup in-
structions, wording of questions, and accuracy-confidence correl-
58. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) Florida continues to use the
Frye standard to test the admissibility of scientific evidence.
59. State v. Sercey, 825 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
60. Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983).
61. Michael Leippe, The case for expert testimony about eyewitness memory, 1(4)
PSCHYOL. PUB. POL'Y & L 909 (1995). Leippe identified two other grounds for excluding
expert testimony: (1) usurping the role of the jury, and (2) the testimony is more prejudicial
than probative. The first has been largely abandoned by the courts as a reason for exclusion
as long as experts do not testify about the credibility or accuracy of a particular witness. Id.
at 922. The second is not Florida's reason for excluding expert testimony.
2009
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ation.62 In 2001, Kassin, along with three other researchers, Tubb,
Hosch and Memon, published findings from a new and revised survey
of sixty-fout prominent researchers (not necessarily the same individu-
als from the first study) on their perceptions of the reliability of
eyewitness-identification-research findings.63 Similar to the 1989 find-
ings, researchers overwhelmingly agreed on the reliability of expert
testimony for the following reasons: the wording of questions can af-
fect eyewitness testimony (98%), lineup instructions by police can
influence eyewitness willingness to identify a subject (98%), attitudes
and expectations may affect eyewitnesses perception and memory of
events (92%), eyewitness confidence does not predict accuracy (the ac-
curacy-confidence correlation) (87%), memory loss is greatest right
after an event, and then levels off (the forgetting curve) (83%), the less
exposure time an eyewitness has of an event, the less likely it will be
remembered (81%), and eyewitnesses may identify, as a culprit, an in-
dividual they have seen in another situation or context (unconscious
transference 64)(81%).65
There was little consensus, however, on some factors: "effects of
color perception in monochromatic light (63%), observer training
(61%), high levels of stress (60%), the accuracy of hypnotically-re-
freshed testimony (45%) and event violence (37%). ''66 Two factors were
found to be more reliable in 2001 than 1989: (1) 87% of experts agreed
the weapon-focus effect was reliable, as compared with only 57% in
1989, and (2) 91% agreed that hypnotic-suggestibility effects were reli-
able, as compared with only 69% in 1989.67
Kassin et al. also examined 13 new eyewitness phenomena not
studied in 1989. Six were viewed by at least 80% of the experts as relia-
ble for court testimony:
[E]yewitness confidence is malleable and influenced by factors un-
related to accuracy (96%), that exposure to mug shots of a suspect
increases the likelihood of his or her selection from a subsequent
lineup (95%), that young children are more vulnerable than adults
to suggestion and other social influences (94%), that alcohol impairs
eyewitness performance (90%), that eyewitnesses find it relatively
62. Kassin et al., The General Acceptance of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony, 44 Am. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989).
63. Kassin et al., On The "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A
New Survey of The Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001).
64. Deborah Davis et al., Unconscious Transference Can Be An Instance Of Change
Blindness, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 605 (2008).





difficult to identify members of a race other than their own (90%)
and that the risk of false identification is increased by the use of a
simultaneous as opposed to sequential presentation format (81%).68
Two-thirds of the experts thought the following three items were suffi-
ciently reliable: "[Ildentification accuracy is increased by having foils
that match the witness's description of the culprit (71%), that young
children are less accurate witnesses than adults (70%), and that the
memories people recover from childhood are often false or distorted in
some way (68%)."69
The remaining four items were deemed not reliable by most ex-
perts: (1) elderly witnesses are less accurate than younger adults, (2)
identification speed is predictive of accuracy, (3) it is possible to differ-
entiate between true and false memories, and (4) traumatic
experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered.
70
3. Beyond the common knowledge
71
Although some factors influencing mistaken identification may
be common knowledge, most are not. Experts surveyed in Kassin
showed that most believed the findings about reduced exposure time
and the affect of alcohol intoxication were commonsense. But most
72
agreed that testimony is necessary and beneficial to educate jurors on
nonintuitive factors.
7 3
Surveys and experimental studies demonstrate that psychologi-
cal research on the factors influencing eyewitness identification and
testimony are beyond commonsense. In several studies, jurors were
unable to identify the variables most affecting identifications and they
overestimated eyewitness accuracy. 74 In a review of the literature,
68. Id. at 410-11.
69. Id. at 411.
70. Id.
71. See Leippe, supra note 61.
72. Kassin et al., supra note 63 (75% or more agreed).
73. Kassin et al., supra note 63, at 412 (e.g., wording of questions, confidence
malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, post-event information, hypnotic suggestibility,
accuracy-confidence, presentation format, unconscious transference, false-childhood
memories, and event violence).
74. J.C. Brigham & R.K. Bothwell, The Ability Of Prospective Jurors To Estimate The
Accuracy Of Eyewitness Identification, 7 LAW. & HUM. BEHAv.19 (1983) (awareness of the
unreliability of eyewitness identification was not common knowledge among sample of
registered voters); Deffenbacher & Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding of
Eyewitness Behavior? 6 LAw. & HUM. BEHV.t5 (1982) (college students and Washington
D.C. citizens under-estimated problems associated with the reliability of identifications,
particularly cross-racial identifications); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock Jurors Belief of
Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication, 13 LAW. & HUM. BEHAv. 333 (1989)
2009
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Leippe identified the following factors affecting identifications as un-
recognized by non-experts: (1) cross-racial identification bias, (2)
weapon focus, (3) prior identification from a mug shot, (4) status of the
witness, and (5) the confidence-accuracy relationship. 75 In other re-
search, respondents mistakenly believed eyewitness confidence was
correlated with accurate identification 76 and cross-racial identifica-
tions were not more suspect.77 McAuliff and Kovera found respondents
were less likely than experts to understand the consequences of wit-
ness suggestibility. 78 And Schmechel, O'Toole, Easterly and Loftus 79
surveyed potential jurors in the District of Columbia and found they
misunderstood how memory functions and they did not understand the
effects of particular factors.
4. Traditional safeguards, not guarding
Empirical studies demonstrate that traditional methods cross-
examination, jury instructions and argument - do not counteract mis-
taken identifications. Staged-crime and eyewitness identification
studies show that questioning does little to "shake" the confidence of
(undergraduate mock jurors failed to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
eyewitnesses, cross-examined by experienced and inexperienced defense lawyers); R.C.L.
Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Between
Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981) (mock jurors "over-believed" witnesses in low-
accuracy-witness scenarios); Wells & Leippe, How Do the Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identification? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can be Misleading, 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682 (1981) (mock jurors incorrectly assumed a positive correlation
between accurate identification and memory of peripheral details); G. Wells et al., Accuracy,
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identifications, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
440 (1979) (mock jurors unable to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witness
identifications).
75. Leippe, supra note 61, 919-921 (citing Deffenbacher & Loftus for the factor "status
of the witness;" for example, police are no better at identifications than untrained
witnesses).
76. Robert K. Bothwell et al., Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence:
Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 691 (1987); Siegfried Ludwig
Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-
Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 319 (1995).
77. J.C. Brigham & R.K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983).
78. Bradley McAuliff & Margaret Bull, Estimating the Effects of Misleading
Information on Witness Accuracy: Can Experts Tell Jurors Something They Don't Already
Know?, 21 J. APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 849 (2007).
79. Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond The Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 (2006) (For example, stress and
weapons effect the reliability of identifications).
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eyewitnesses.80 Other studies show that lawyers are unfamiliar with
factors that influence identifications. 8 ' In two studies, lawyers were
found insensitive to bias in line-up presentations, resulting in their in-
ability to educate juries.8 2  Cross-examining witnesses rarely
influenced juror verdicts, except when the witness was a child who
gave inconsistent statements.8 3 However, in a study of 300 partici-
pants, Berman and Cutler found that when the inconsistencies in
testimony involved on the stand or on the stand and pretrial state-
ments, .participants were less likely to convict and found witness
identification less effective.8 4 The marginal effectiveness of cross-ex-
amining witnesses is tempered by the likelihood that many witnesses
do not make inconsistent statements and most do not lie. They are
mistaken and their identifications are inaccurate. Cross-examining
those witnesses does not provide jurors with information about the fac-
tors affecting mistaken-identifications.8 5
Jury instructions are typically incomplete, confuse jurors and
do not improve the quality of decisions.8 6 Instructions are also not in-
tended as teaching tools to educate jurors about evaluating eyewitness
testimony so they are largely ineffective.8 7
80. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A
Replication and Extension, 13 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1989); M.R. Leippe & A.
Romanczyk, Reactions to Child (Versus Adult) Eyewitnesses: The Influence Of Jurors'
Preconceptions And Witness Behavior, 13 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 103 (1989); G.L. Berman et
al., Effects Of Inconsistent Eyewitness Statements of Mock-Jurors' Evaluations of the
Eyewitness Perceptions of Defendant Culpability and Verdicts, 19 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 79
(1995).
81. V. Stinson et al., How Effective is the Presence-of-Counsel Safeguard? Attorney
Perceptions of Suggestiveness, Fairness, and Correctability of Biased Lineup Procedures, 81
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 64 (1996).
82. Id.; See Gary L. Wells, What do we Know About Eyewitness Identification? 48 AM.
PSYCHOL. 553 (1993).
83. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 447 (1986).
84. Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness
Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170 (1996).
85. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909, 923-4 (1995).
86. Id.; Brian L. Cutler et al., Nonadversarial Methods of Sensitizing Jurors to
Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197 (1990); E. Greene, Judge's
Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 252 (1988).
87. Leippe, supra note 61 at 17.
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5. Florida cases must resolve its conflicted treatment of this science
Eyewitness-identification testimony is scientific. Research
dates to the 1900s and modern empirically based research began in the
1970s. 8 Special training in psychology, methodology and science is
required to conduct research and eyewitness-identification findings
have been subjected to peer-review. The research is generally accepted
in the scientific community;8 9 and testimony on the factors influencing
misidentification is helpful to jurors.
Yet, in 1983, eyewitness-identification experts in Florida were
precluded from testifying because the Florida Supreme Court held that
testimony was not beyond the knowledge of jurors, it was common-
sense.90 Fifteen years later, in McMullen,91 the court seemingly
receded from that per se exclusion, leaving the admissibility of eyewit-
ness testimony in the sound discretion of the trial courts. Johnson was
not overruled.
McMullen was a case where identity of the perpetrator was the
sole issue, with no other evidence placing him at the crime scene.
Under those circumstances, the court found excluding expert testi-
mony on eyewitness-identification was not error.9 2 No Florida
appellate court to date has found that excluding eyewitness testimony
is an abuse of discretion and many of the decisions rely on Johnson
upholding the exclusion of testimony, reinvigorating its faulty reason-
ing that testimony is not helpful to juries.93
In 2006, the Florida Supreme Court, in Simmons v. State,94 re-
viewed homicide, kidnapping and sexual battery convictions. Among
other evidence, the state introduced several witnesses who placed Sim-
mons with the victim. The trial judge excluded expert testimony
advanced by Simmons on the psychological factors contributing to erro-
neous witness identifications when police use suggestive techniques.
The court held that there was no abuse of discretion. The Florida Su-
88. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its Probative Value, 7
PSYCHOL. SC. in the PUB. INT. 45 (2006).
89. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
90. Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (1983). And, in three cases, following Johnson, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld trial court decisions excluding eyewitness- identification
testimony (Espinosa v. State, 589 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1991); Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
1990) and Hooper v. State, 476 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985)), and in one case, upheld the trial
judge's decision to admit, but limit, an expert's testimony on the topic. (Rogers v. State, 511
So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987)).
91. McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1998).
92. Id.
93. Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2008).
94. 934 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006).
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preme Court relied on Johnson and McMullen for the principle that
excluding expert-testimony on matters within the common knowledge
of jurors is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.9 5 A year later,
in Frances v. State9 6 and citing Johnson and Simmons, the Florida Su-
preme Court again held no abuse of discretion by the trial court for
excluding expert testimony because the matters did not require special
knowledge or experience.
Citing Simmons, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Pietri v.
State97 excluded expert witness testimony because the testimony
amounted to common knowledge, and it did not require any special
knowledge to understand the unreliability factors in identification
cases. Pietri was convicted of burglary in a case where a police officer
testified about a description, which was given to her by a child victim,
concerning a man breaking into a man's house.98 The expert would
have testified about the factors that may have influenced the ability of
the child-victim to make an accurate identification.9 9 Applying Florida
law, the Pietri court found no error:
Applying the law established by our Supreme Court in Johnson v.
State [citations omitted] and confirmed in McMullen v. State, [cita-
tions omitted], and Simmons v. State, [citations omitted] we find no
error. As in those cases, the facts to be established by the expert in
the present case amounted to testimony concerning the general
problems associated with witness identification, and common fac-
tors that could lead to a false identification. In the context of the
present case, these matters did not require special knowledge, and
the testimony was properly excluded. 100
In 2008, the Florida Supreme Court in Green v. State101 held a
trial court did not err by denying an evidentiary hearing on the ineffec-
tiveness of counsel for failing to retain an expert to challenge cross-
racial identification:
First, the record conclusively shows that Green is not entitled to
relief based on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
retain an expert witness on cross-racial identification. It is unlikely
that such testimony would have been admitted. See Johnson v.
95. Id. at 1116-17.
96. 970 So. 2d 806, 814 (Fla. 2007).
97. 935 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 5th. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 85 (for example, the expert witness would have testified to her age, lighting,
passage of time, and the character of the photo-lineup).
100. Pietri, 935 So. 2d at 85-6. In a footnote to this paragraph, the Court noted, "The
expert in McMullen and Simmons is the same person whose testimony was proffered by the
appellant in the present case."
101. 975 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2008).
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State, [citations omitted] (holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to allow a professor of psychology to testify
as an expert witness in the field of eyewitness identification). See
also McMullen v. State,[citations omitted] ("Johnson could be inter-
preted as a per se rule of inadmissibility of this type of
testimony.")
1 0 2
The holding "that a jury is fully capable of assessing a witness'
ability to perceive and remember, given the assistance of cross-exami-
nation and cautionary instructions, without the aid of expert
testimony"10 3 has been debunked by research dating to 1983. Further-
more, Justice Pariente, concurring in Simmons,10 4 highlighted the
contradictions of the holdings in Johnson, Green and Pietri, by her
compelling argument that Johnson should not be interpreted as bar-
ring expert testimony on eyewitness identification because that
testimony clearly helps juries: "It is now clear that such testimony can
assist the jury in assessing guilt in certain cases, especially where, as
some courts have recognized, the only inculpatory evidence is eyewit-
ness testimony."'1 5  Justice Pariente found that research conducted
since 1983, demonstrated that eyewitness-identification testimony was
not a matter of commonsense, and in some instances the findings con-
tradicted commonsense. 106 As illustrated by the accuracy-certainty
example: "research shows that a witness' degree of certainty correlates
weakly, at best, with the accuracy of the identification."10 7 Pariente
found that difficulty in cross-racial identifications is well established
by research. 0 8 Many believe that error-rates of misidentification are
similar, when in fact there is a higher degree of inaccuracy in cross-
racial identifications.10 9
102. Id. at 1107.
103. Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983).
104. Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1124-26 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring) (interpreting
Johnson as not barring expert testimony on eyewitness identification).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1124.
107. Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1124 (Pariente, J., concurring), (citing ELIZABETH LOFTUS
& JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 3-12, at 67) (3rd ed. 1997)
("The consensus of the literature that deals with [whether eyewitness confidence is an
indication of eyewitness accuracy] seems to indicate that eyewitness confidence is not a very
good indicator of eyewitness accuracy."); See also, GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS: SCIENTIFIC STATUS, IN SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE ISSUES 391, 412 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
108. Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1124.
109. Id. (citing Loftus & Doyle, supra, § 4-9, at 86; Wells, supra, at 404). A 2002 report
by.the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment reflects "[tihe fallibility of
eyewitness testimony has become increasingly well-documented in both academic literature
and in courts of law." Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 31
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Contradictions in Florida law on admitting or abusing discre-
tion by excluding eyewitness identification testimony must be resolved.
In order to resolve the inconsistencies, Florida courts must: (1) apply
scientific standards to eyewitness-identification experts, (2) employ
constitutional standards on defendants' right to present their theories
of defense, and (3) overrule Johnson and McMullen to the extent that
those decisions are interpreted as barring eyewitness identifications as
not helpful to juries.
C. Conflict III: Discretion in sheep's clothing
Despite Justice Pariente's observations that fallibility of eyewit-
ness identification is well documented by science and some courts, 110
appellate courts remain unwilling to find discretion abused when that
expert testimony is excluded. According to a recent study, a national
trend. In 2006, Benton et al.,"' found little difference between courts
adopting the prohibitory as compared to the discretionary approach to
the admission of eyewitness-identification testimony. Although the
majority of courts adopted the discretionary approach, the analysis un-
covered that many courts really applied per se exclusion 1 2 and called
it discretionary:
(2002), available at http://state.il.us/defender/report.pdf. See similarly, the North Carolina
Actual Innocence Commission organized by Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake Jr., of the North
Carolina Supreme Court "chose eyewitness identification as its first topic of study because
research has identified misidentification as the leading factor in the wrongful conviction of
those exonerated nationally by DNA evidence." Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina
Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 647, 652 (2004).
110. Simmons, 943 So. 2d at 59-64. Justice Pariente cited many research studies and
the 2002 report by the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment and North
Carolina's Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr., where she chose eyewitness identification as
the first topic to study because misidentification is the leading factor in wrongful
convictions. Additionally, Justice Pariente cited decisions from the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court concluding that eyewitness identification
testimony should not be excluded when it is a "key element" of the state's case and there is
little corroboration of the identification.
111. Tanja Rapus Benton et al., On the Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: A Legal and Scientific Evaluation, 2 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 392 (2006). See also
Thomas Dillickrath, Evidence of Innocence Offered by the Criminal Defendant, Not So Fast:
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. MiMI
L. REv. 1059 (2001); Jennifer Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of
Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1895 (2005).
112. Since the publication of Benton, McDonnell, Thomas, Ross & HonerKamp (2006),
the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed its decision barring eyewitness-identification
testimony. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299 (Tenn. 2007). Noting, "times have
changed," the court reversed its prior decision because hundreds of scholarly, legal, and
scientific articles and books support the view that eyewitness-identification testimony is not
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While it initially may appear that courts are turning away from
[the prohibitory] approach to adopt the approach of the majority in
a discretionary view, our analysis reveals that many courts are us-
ing the "discretionary" approach as a guise, but are basically still
operating in a manner that is nearly per se exclusionary. 113
Florida is one of those courts that applied per se exclusion and called it
discretionary. 114 By upholding decisions that exclude experts, even
where no other evidence of guilt exists, reasoning that testimony is un-
necessary to assist juries amounts to per se exclusion." 5 In addition,
these decisions conflict with the way Florida courts treat the exclusion
of other types of evidence under the same standard.
Relevant and reliable evidence is typically admitted at trial.
Expert testimony is admitted, particularly to prove identity. Some ex-
amples include handwriting analysis, hair-comparison,
1' 6 DNA," 7
and fingerprint evidence. According to Charles W. Ehrhardt,
EHRHARDT'S FLORIDA EVIDENCE §702.2 (2008), court decisions reflect
that experts may testify about subjects, even when jurors may have
some understanding of an issue. In Boyer v. State,"8 the First District
Court of Appeal held a trial judge abused discretion by excluding ex-
pert testimony on false-confession phenomena on the basis that it was
not helpful to the jury: "Even though the jury may have beliefs about
the subject, the question is whether those beliefs are correct."119 In
two other cases, trial courts were found to abuse discretion by exclud-
ing expert testimony that (1) explained how fibers are released from
clothes and dispersed during a traffic accident 20 and (2) interpreted
the damage to a car and victim injuries.
12'
based on commonsense. Id. The Copeland court also rejected the view that cross-
examination or jury instructions - without expert testimony - were sufficient to educate
juries. Id. The only safeguard against mistaken identification was expert testimony. Id.
113. Benton, supra note 111.
114. Benton, supra note 111, at 406.
115. Evidence scholar, Charles Ehrhardt questions under what circumstance
eyewitness-identification testimony would be admitted: "From the McMullen decision it is
unclear when, if ever, expert testimony regarding this subject would be admissible."
CHARLES EHRHARDT, EHRHARDTS FLORIDA EVIDENCE, §702.2 n. 4 (2008 Edition).
116. Jackson v. State, 511 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
117. See e.g., Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2002) (DNA expert qualified to
testify).
118. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 418-19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
119. Id.
120. Barfield v. State, 880 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
121. Mathieu v. Schnitzer, 559 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.1990).
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Florida courts admit expert testimony based on the following:
(1) serology, 122 (2) blood-spatter evidence, 123 (3) effect of alcohol,' 24 (4)
forced-intercourse injuries, 25 (5) disclosure rates of child-sex-abuse
victims, 126 and (6) symptoms of child-abuse victims. 127 Police officers
also regularly testify as experts in drug-identification cases involving
marijuana and cocaine.'
28
Facts that are well known and not helpful to the jury are inad-
missible. On that basis, courts have excluded expert testimony that an
elderly woman, approached by a gun-toting man would be terrified 29
and identifying the aggressor in a fight. 30 The subject of eyewitness-
identification, however, involves facts that are not well known, and in
some instances, counterintuitive to common knowledge (e.g., that eye-
witness confidence is not correlated with accuracy of the
identification).
In eyewitness-identification cases, Justices Pariente, in Sim-
mons, and Anstead, in McMullen, have encouraged and urged trial
courts to either admit this testimony or truly exercise their discretion:
Accordingly, I encourage trial courts to truly exercise their discre-
tion as to the admission of this testimony. Trial judges should
consider, as they do with other expert testimony, whether the testi-
mony would assist the jury, i.e., whether it would introduce
relevant considerations as to accuracy that could not otherwise be
brought to light via cross-examination, jury instructions, or the ju-
rors' commonsense. As the research demonstrates and courts
increasingly recognize, expert testimony in this area can be a pow-
122. Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (overruled in part) (for example, when
a knife with a bloody handle hits bone, the grip may slip").
123. Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1988) (overruled in part) (for example,
spatters that come from a high velocity weapon).
124. Calandra v. State, 727 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
125. Russell v. State, 576 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 587
So.2d 1329 (Fla. 1991).
126. Quintero v. State, 889 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (for example,
victims do not initially fully disclose in 67% to 70% of cases).
127. Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (for example,
psychological testimony that symptoms were "consistent with those displayed by victims of
child abuse").
128. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000) (cocaine); Pama v. State, 552
So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (marijuana); Sinclair v. State, 995 So. 2d 552,
2008 WL 4057841 (Fla. 3rd. Dist. App. 2008) (cocaine). For a review and critique of this
trend, see Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on
Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript
White Powder in Narcotics Transactions, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 557 (1998).
129. Jordan v. State, 694 So. 2d 708, 717 (Fla. 1997).
130. Smith v. Hooligan's Pub & Oyster Bar, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 596, 600 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
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erful tool in helping the criminal justice system achieve its goal of
convicting the guilty while acquitting the innocent.' 3 1
Obviously, cajoling hasn't worked. Moreover, it is time that appellate
courts resolve the conflicts in its application of the abuse of discretion
standard. When evidence is excluded that supports the defense theory,
Florida courts generally find the trial court abused discretion. But, not
when the trial courts exclude eyewitness-identification expert
testimony.
"Where evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish
a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admis-
sion."'132 The Second District Court of Appeal in Corley v. State133 held
that the fingerprints found at the scene of a homicide, that did not be-
long to neither the victim nor the defendant, was admissible to support
the defense theory that someone else committed the crime. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court mimicked that holding in Watts v. State. 34 In
Watts, the Florida Supreme Court reversed Watts' conviction for rob-
bery because the trial judge excluded fingerprints from someone other
than the defendant. 135 The Watts Court reasoned that the fingerprints
should have been admitted because they supported the defense theory
that someone else committed the robbery.' 36 The Second District
Court of Appeal in Story v. State137 held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it excluded testimony that employees of defendant en-
gaged in fraud because that evidence tended to prove that Story did not
have the specific intent to commit theft. She was unaware of her em-
ployees' fraud, and she had the constitutional right to present that
defense. 38
Trial courts do not have unlimited discretion to exclude testi-
mony when that testimony supports the defense's theory. 139 In Jacobs
v. State, 40 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
131. Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1126 (concurring).
132. Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990) (citing Moreno v. State, 418 So. 2d
1223, 1225 (Fla. 3rd Dist Ct. App. 1982)). See also Corley v. State, 335 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Story v. State, 589 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Watts
v. State, 354 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
133. Corley, 335 So. 2d at 850.
134. Watts, 354 So. 2d at 145-6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Story, 589 So. 2d at 942-3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
138. Id.
139. See Docekal v. State, 929 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
the trial court erred by prohibiting cross-examination "when the facts sought to be elicited
are germane to that witness' testimony and plausibly relevant to the theory of defense").
140. 962 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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court's decision excluding evidence that tended to support Jacob's de-
fense that he was insane at the time he killed his wife. The evidence,
which amounted to telephone calls, messages, hand-written notes, and
9-1-1 calls, did tend to support Jacob's claim. 141 The trial court's view
of that evidence was irrelevant; however, the evidence should have
been admitted because it tended to support the defendant's theory.
The same is true for the limits placed on excluding expert testi-
mony. In Boyer v. State,142 the First District Court of Appeal held that
a defense psychology expert on false confessions should have been per-
mitted to testify because the evidence was relevant and Frye was
satisfied. It was the jury's decision to determine the weight given to the
testimony. 143 Excluding the expert was not harmless because his testi-
mony "went to the heart" of Boyer's defense.14 4 Moreover, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Anderson v. State,145 reversed the trial
court's decision to exclude testimony by a telemarketing expert, in a
racketeering and fraud case, on the ground that scripts and false
names were common practice in legitimate telemarketing. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal's discretion was abused when it found the
telemarketing information was not helpful to the jury: "An ordinary
person, unfamiliar with industry practices, would not know that
scripts and false names are generally an accepted practice in the
telemarketing field."146 The error was not harmless because the jury
was left with only the negative impression of the scripts and false
names, which could lead to believing he actively participated in the
fraud.147
III. CONCLUSION
Eyewitness-identification testimony is relevant and scientific.
The testimony goes directly to the heart of the defense theory of mis-
taken identification. Furthermore, the sound discretion of the trial
court is abused when essential, critical and reliable evidence support-
ing the defense theory and raising reasonable doubt is excluded.
Florida law conflicts with constitutional principles, science, and its
own decisions on applying the standards of review for admitting or ex-
141. Id. at 935.
142. Boyer, 825 So. 2d at 418-19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
143. Id. at 420.
144. Id. But cf Beltran v. State, 700 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
145. 786 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id.
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cluding evidence. Florida must resolve these inconsistencies to
preserve a defendant's constitutional rights. Trial courts should admit
eyewitness-identification testimony when it is relevant, or risk rever-
sal by appellate courts when it is excluded.
